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This paper introduces a number of indicators on various aspects of 
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policies comparable. It contains an indicator concerned with the objectives 
and the instruments of competition laws, a second indicator evaluating to 
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law, it further presents an indicator reflecting the formal independence of 
competition agencies and a fourth one reflecting their factual 
independence. These four indicators are used to estimate the effects of 
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Competition Policies Matter – At least at the Margin: Cross-Country 
Evidence Using Four New Indicators 
1 Introduction 
Competition is of overwhelming importance for the functioning of market 
economies – or so the conventional wisdom goes. In countless textbooks, 
competition is ascribed many important functions such as securing that supply 
conforms to consumer preferences, producing allocative efficiency, setting 
incentives for the development of new products and production methods, i.e. 
dynamic efficiency, ensuring that behavior is adopted to changed circumstances, 
and also to constrain the power of single firms. The next slice of the conventional 
wisdom reads somewhat like this: the beneficial functioning of competition is not 
secured spontaneously but must be supported by state action, such as competition 
laws and competition agencies. 
Given this conventional wisdom, it is surprising how little we really know about 
the effects of competition policies. Are competition agencies conducive to higher 
rates of economic growth? Does it make any difference whether they are 
independent from government? Does this hold independently of the contents of 
the competition laws? 
There have been very few studies on these issues. If they exist at all, they are 
based on subjective indicators to assess a country’s competition policies. Yet, 
such subjective indicators have serious drawbacks: The scores attributed to the 
countries depend on the expectations one has with regard to them. Local 
businesspeople might not be familiar with the policies of other countries and 
might have difficulties in comparing policies. We therefore introduce four 
objective competition policy indicators here that deal with (i) the substantive 
content of competition laws, (ii) the degree to which they incorporate an economic 
approach, (iii) the formal independence of the competition agencies that are to 
implement the competition laws, and (iv) the factual independence of the 
competition agencies. Earlier research on the independence of the judiciary (Feld 
and Voigt 2003, 2004) has shown that formal and factual independence are not 
necessarily highly correlated and that they can have very different effects. This is 
why we strictly distinguish between these two aspects. 
The dataset on which the four indicators are based also allows us to compare 
competition laws systematically and, in particular, to identify recent trends in 
competition policy. Today, some 90 states have competition laws. Out of these, 
our dataset covers 57. The four indicators further enable us to answer the question  3
whether competition policies in a narrow sense are a good proxy for government 
policies towards competition more widely conceived. If competition policies in 
the narrow sense are to safeguard competition, they should be correlated with the 
absence of barriers to (international) trade, of barriers to open new firms, of 
bureaucratic impediments in the management of firms etc. Comparing these 
various policies that all deal with competition in a broad sense allows us to deal 
with the question whether competition laws in the narrow sense protect 
competition or rather competitors. It also allows us to make some statements 
concerning the compatibility of various government policies. The four indicators 
finally enable us to ascertain the effects of competition laws. Bluntly stated: can 
one show that competition legislation is conducive to economic growth? Even 
more bluntly stated: does it make any difference if countries have competition 
laws? 
Based on the four new indicators, we find that generally, competition policies and 
other policies seem to re-enforce each other. However, the existence of a 
competition policy is positively correlated with the existence of an industrial 
policy. Based on a sample of up to almost one hundred countries, an econometric 
model is estimated that explains differences in total factor productivity by the four 
new competition indicators and standard controls. All four indicators contribute to 
explaining differences in total factor productivity. Some 30 aspects of competition 
laws and policies are explicitly analyzed. Among them, the number of years that a 
competition law has existed, the focus of the competition agency exclusively on 
competition, the impossibility to re-appoint the highest competition officer, and 
the development of the budget of the competition agency in real terms appear to 
be the single most important ones. Yet, the four indicators are not robust to the 
inclusion of indicators that proxy for the quality of institutions in a very general 
sense. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: some competing views concerning 
possible relationships between competition and growth will be dealt with in 
section two. They include an overview over the existing empirical studies. Section 
three compares competition laws as well as formal and factual independence of 
competition agencies. Section four deals with the question whether competition 
laws in a narrow sense are a good proxy for government policies toward 
competition in a more general way. In the fifth section, our estimation approach is 
described and some estimates are carried out. Section six concludes.  4
2 Does More Competition Lead to Higher Growth? An Overview of 
Competing Views 
Economists still quarrel about the effects of the intensity of competition for 
innovation as well as for growth. Schumpeter (1942) famously claimed that 
monopolistic firms are more innovative because they face looser financial 
restrictions and because they will be able to cash in on their innovations more 
sweepingly than smaller firms with small or even negligible market shares. 
Schumpeter thus argued that monopolistic market structures would lead to higher 
rates of innovation (and subsequently growth) and hence introduced a tradeoff 
between static and dynamic efficiency. This argument has been picked up in some 
growth models recently (e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1992 or Aghion, Bloom, 
Blundell, Griffith and Howitt 2005). The theoretical argument is still contested 
and the empirical evidence highly ambiguous (Cohen/Levin 1989 and Rey 1997 
are overviews). Yet, the Schumpeter hypothesis has had important policy 
implications as it has been used to justify the creation of national champions. 
Given that there is no consensus on the relationship between the intensity of 
competition and growth, it is not surprising that there is no consensus on adequate 
competition policies: if the optimal intensity of competition is unclear, then the 
market structure that competition policy should strive to bring about is just as 
unclear. Yet, some 90 states have passed general competition laws which could 
have effects on the ensuing market structures by prohibiting mergers, cartels etc. 
Since theory does not provide an unequivocal signpost, we propose to let the data 
speak, i.e. to ask whether competition policy has any discernible effect on 
economic growth. 
Konings et al. (2001) have asked whether differences in mark-ups between 
Belgium and the Netherlands can be explained by differences in the respective 
competition policies. As expected, mark-ups are higher in the Netherlands 
because a strict competition law was introduced only after the analyzed period. 
Yet, the introduction of a new competition law in Belgium did not have any effect 
on the mark-ups there. The effects of competition policies seem thus limited. 
Whereas the Konings et al. (2001) study focuses on very detailed data from the 
manufacturing sectors in two countries, we are here interested in a cross-country 
study and will thus apply a coarser brush. 
Dutz and Hayri (1999) have produced a cross-country study and have found that 
the perceived effectiveness of a country’s competition policy is a variable that 
helps to explain differences in economic growth beyond the variables 
conventionally used in models of economic growth. This is an interesting insight.  5
Yet, it is based on subjective evaluations of surveyed businesspeople and 
subjective indicators have serious drawbacks: The scores attributed to the 
countries depend on the expectations one has with regard to them. Local 
businesspeople might not be familiar with the policies of other countries and 
might have difficulties in comparing policies. To answer the question whether 
antimonopoly policy is effective in a country can also be heavily influenced by the 
effectiveness of other policy areas such as trade, regulation, privatization and so 
forth. Answers would thus reflect the effectiveness of a mix of policies rather than 
antitrust policy narrowly conceived. 
Dutz and Hayri (1999) use competition policy variables such as the legal and 
regulatory framework encouraging competition as a proxy for the intensity of 
competition. The legal framework as such, can, however, only provide the 
preconditions for intensive competition and not intensive competition itself. We 
thus keep the two meticulously apart. 
Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000) assess the effectiveness of competition policy 
implementation in 18 transition countries. Effectiveness is measured in three 
categories, namely (i) enforcement, (ii) competition advocacy, and (iii) 
institutional effectiveness. The authors find a “robust positive relationship 
between effective competition policy implementation and expansion of more 
efficient private firms.” Their paper thus contains an attempt to get away from 
subjective perceptions of competition and towards measuring competition policies 
with an emphasis on policy implementation. The drawback is the low number of 
countries for which data are available. 
Representatives of public choice theory have argued that competition laws often 
serve to protect competitors rather than competition. The mere existence of a 
general competition law is thus not sufficient to assume that competition-
enhancing policies will be implemented. If this possibility is taken seriously, two 
consequences for empirical research follow: (1) Aims, instruments, 
implementation mechanisms etc. need to be analyzed in detail, in particular with 
their likely impacts on competition. The “competition friendliness” of competition 
laws should thus not be taken for granted but be explicitly inquired into. (2) The 
“competition friendliness” of other policy areas should be explicitly taken into 
account. One crucial precondition for intensive competition to emerge is that 
market entry is not prohibitively costly. One important determinant of the costs of 
entry is government behavior: potentially relevant variables include out of pocket 
costs to get the necessary permits, but also costs in terms of time needed to 
receive them. These costs are often prohibitive, if supply of some goods is  6
confined to a limited number of companies, if imports are subject to tight caps etc. 
The ease of entry into a market is also determined by governments’ willingness to 
let inefficient firms go bust. If politicians try to save even very uncompetitive 
large firms, this will prevent allocative efficiency from materializing which, in 
turn, will lead to lower growth rates. 
Besides the goals and instruments of competition laws, i.e. their material content, 
another aspect of potential importance is the way they are supposed to be 
implemented. Over the last couple of years, an entire cottage industry dealing with 
independent government agencies and their effects has evolved. This literature 
posits that the representatives of independent agencies have the advantage of not 
having to strive for general popularity because they do not need to get reelected 
by the citizen voters. This enables them to carry out decisions that are unpopular 
in the short run but may enhance efficiency – and the prospect for economic 
growth - in the long run. They can thus be a way to ease the problem of time 
inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott 1977). The literature on independent central 
banks is most prominent here: it has been shown that the independence of central 
banks does indeed lead to lower inflation, at least in the member states of the 
OECD (Berger et al. 2001 as well as Hayo and Hefeker 2002 are two surveys). 
Mergers can promise to be efficiency-enhancing but they can still be highly 
unpopular due to substantial job cuts. More generally, governments are often 
tempted to make industrial policy by actively manipulating the structure of certain 
markets etc. The competence over competition policy instruments frequently 
enables governments to carry out such policies. If, however, the competition laws 
of a country unequivocally and exclusively name the maintenance of an adequate 
framework for competition as the goal to be achieved and hands the authority to 
realize this goal to an independent agency, then competition policy should be 
more focused and more effective. Based on this approach, specific attention will 
thus be on the independence of competition agencies. The creation of formally 
independent competition agencies does, however, not abolish the temptation for 
politicians to tinker with their independence should this promise higher payoffs. 
This is why the factual independence of competition agencies will be ascertained 
and used as a different explanatory variable for the success of competitive 
policies. 
In summarizing, it can be said that the literature is quite heterogeneous and no 
consensus on the effects of the intensity of competition for growth is in sight. This 
is also true for the effects of competition policies on both the intensity of 
competition and on growth. A shaky theoretical foundation does, however, not  7
preclude the possibility of having a look at the data. In this paper, we propose to 
analyze the effects of competition laws. Does it make a difference whether a 
country has a competition law at all or does it not? Does the specific contents of 
the competition law make a difference or not? Does it make a difference whether 
the competition agency is independent from other political decision-makers or 
not? These are questions that can be answered even without a generally agreed 
upon theoretical basis informing one on the transmission mechanisms through 
which competition is supposed to influence growth. 
3 Taking Stock: A Comparison of Competition Laws 
3.0 Introductory Remarks 
We define a competition authority as any non-judicial authority which is the 
primary responsible body of the country for the enforcement of competition law 
and other activities in the competition policy area (note that this definition is 
almost identical to the one used in OECD 2003). Competition laws are any laws 
that deal with competition in a general, i.e. non-sector specific, sense. They 
include merger laws, antitrust laws and the like. The next question would then be: 
how exactly do they matter? We propose to distinguish two aspects in the analysis 
of competition laws namely (i) their contents, and (ii) the organizational structure 
that is supposed to implement the laws. 
Our aim is to synthesize various variables into meaningful indicators. Four such 
indicators are introduced here, one reflecting the basis and the contents of the 
various competition laws, a second one reflecting the degree to which competition 
laws rely on economic reasoning, a third one reflecting the formal degree of 
independence of the competition agency, and a fourth one reflecting its factual 
independence. Each of the variables used for the construction of the four 
indicators can take on values between 0 and 1 where greater values indicate a 
higher degree of competition mindedness or independence. The sum of the coded 
variables is divided by the number of variables for which data was available. The 
indicators can thus take on any value between 0 and 1.1 
                                                 
1   This means that equal weight is attached to all variables. It can, of course, be argued that they 
should be weighted according to their importance. This presupposes, however, that there is a 
theory according to which weights could be attached. Such a theory is not available at present. One 
could also think of attaching weights ex post, for example by using factor analysis, such that the 
explanatory fit is maximized. Indeed any weighting is more or less arbitrary without the existence of  8
Before describing the various variables as well as carrying out a comparison of the 
57 competition laws included in our analysis, one word concerning the underlying 
dataset is in order: A questionnaire and an accompanying letter explaining the 
purpose of the research project were sent to all known competition agencies via 
traditional mail.2 Approximately two months later, all agencies that had not 
responded to the first letter received the questionnaire again. Another three 
months later, the agencies that had not responded to the first two letters were 
contacted via e-mail with the same request. The questionnaire was designed such 
that the representatives of competition agencies would not have to make personal 
evaluations of the situation in their country, but simply to give information on the 
legal and factual situation of their agency. It is conjectured that they had little 
incentives not to fill in the questionnaire truthfully. The overall response rate of 
63% is not bad for the chosen approach.3 The questionnaire is reproduced as 
appendix 1 here. Please note that the coding of the variables was not contained in 
the version of the questionnaire sent to the competition agencies. 
The estimations themselves are based on more than 57 countries. Since our basic 
question is whether the existence of competition laws makes any perceptible 
difference at all, 37 additional countries that are known not to have a competition 
law were included into the regressions. The description of the results that follows 
is, however, constrained to the 57 countries from which more detailed information 
concerning competition law and practice are available. We now proceed to present 
the motivation as well as the construction of the four indicators and begin with the 
indicator focusing on the basis of competition laws. If variables carry numbers in 
the following text, these numbers refer to the numbers in the questionnaire which 
is reprinted as appendix 1 here. 
                                                                                                                                      
a proper theory for construction of the indexes. This also holds with respect to factors extracted 
from the set of single variables. In the latter case, only statistical criteria are relevant in the 
construction of the index and it is up to the analyst to interpret the factors obtained. We leave a 
further discussion of different weights to future analysis and concentrate on the simplest method of 
computing the indexes by taking an (unweighted) average of the variables. 
2   Concretely, all agencies that are members of the International Competition Network as well as 
those participating in the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy 
within the framework of UNCTAD were asked to complete the questionnaire. The competition 
policy of the EU is included in this analysis as the EU replied to our questionnaire. 
3   For a number of countries we did not receive completed questionnaires from their competition 
agencies but were able to make some competition lawyers complete them for us. These countries 
are: China, Colombia, France, Israel, Peru, and South Africa.  9
3.1 Indicator #1: The Basis of Competition Laws 
Policy areas that are attached a high degree of importance are often mentioned in 
the constitution of a country. The first variable thus asked whether the 
Constitution names competition as a goal to be achieved. In one third of the 
countries analyzed, this was the case, most of them in Latin America or in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Among the competition agencies from OECD-memberstates 
that replied, competition is mentioned as a constitutional goal only in Italy, 
Portugal and Switzerland.4 Interestingly, there are a number of countries that 
name competition as a goal in the constitution but that do not have a general 
competition law and a competition agency (which is the case in the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador and the Philippines). 
The second variable asked whether there was a specific law that had the purpose 
of safeguarding and promoting competition. In all 57 jurisdictions considered, this 
is indeed the case. 
The introduction of a competition policy can be interpreted as a government 
promise to act in certain ways (and not to act in others) with regard to a specific 
policy area, namely competition. Whether the passing of a competition law will be 
interpreted as cheap talk or as a credible commitment by market participants 
depends on a number of determinants, some of which will be dealt with explicitly 
later (e.g. whether the competence to implement the government promise is 
delegated to an independent agency or not). Here, we want to deal with just one 
possible determinant of the credibility ascribed to government, namely the time 
that has passed since the first competition law was inaugurated. Over the last 
couple of decades, more and more countries have passed competition laws. Some 
of them were passed under the gentle pressure of foreign organizations. It can thus 
not be excluded that performance of these laws is less satisfactory as they might 
be perceived as “forced” upon a country externally. 
HERE: Graph # 1 
The U.S. (1890), Canada (1899) and Australia (1906) have the oldest competition 
laws. The policy promises contained in these laws are assumed to be more 
credible than those contained in laws that were passed just a few years ago. 
                                                 
4    Some descriptive statistics concerning the individual variables have been added to the 
questionnaire; these can also be found in appendix 1.  10
What is striking is that more than half of all countries considered here passed their 
competition laws only during the last 15 years. On the one hand, this is a 
consequence of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, on the other, it can 
also be interpreted as a sign for the importance that is now being attached to 
competition on a global scale. 
With regard to the contents of competition laws, we assume that safeguarding and 
promoting competition is their stated purpose. But often, competition laws contain 
other purposes, such as furthering technological progress, improving international 
competitiveness, securing the survival of small and medium enterprises, and 
regional development concerns. Any additional purpose on top of securing 
competition leads to the necessity of making tradeoffs. Tradeoffs are hypothesized 
to reduce the degree to which competition is protected by the law. If competition 
is indeed conducive to growth, one should expect a negative correlation between 
the number of goals other than competition named in the law, and per capita 
income growth. If competition was the only goal in the competition law of a 
country, the country was coded a 1. For every other goal named, 0.125 was 
subtracted from 1 (but the score could never turn negative). Tunisia, the 
Philippines (both 11), Morocco (9), Malta, South Africa (both 8) and Zimbabwe 
(8) were the countries whose competition laws named the highest number of other 
goals. On average, three and a half other goals besides competition were named. 
The lacking consensus in competition theory also holds for the kinds of practices 
that are deemed to be anti-competitive. We have decided to ask for seven such 
practices, namely (i) cartels, (ii) abuse of dominant position, (iii) control of 
mergers, (iv) predatory pricing, (v) price discrimination, (vi) exclusive dealing, 
and (vii) interlocking directorates.5 An eighth possibility was an open option that 
included all relevant practices that had not been included in the explicitly named 
options. Coding followed a very simple scheme: the higher the number of 
practices that were dealt with in the law, the better; every practice dealt with 
earned the country 0.125 points. Bulgaria and Italy only deal with three of these 
practices, and eight countries (Brazil, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malta, 
Spain, Tanzania and Thailand) scored the maximum score, indicating that their 
competition laws deal with eight practices often considered to be in conflict with 
                                                 
5   (iv), (v), and (vi) can all be part of abuse of a dominant position; they are named separately here in 
order to be able to ascertain the ways that abuse of dominant positions is dealt with in various 
jurisdictions.  11
beneficial competition. On average, a little more than six such practices were 
named in the competition laws here under consideration.6 
These four variables are synthesized into the first indicator that is to proxy for the 
bases of competition law here according to the procedure described above. 
3.2 Indicator #2: Economic Approach 
The first aspect explicitly recognized in the second new indicator deals with a 
contentious issue, namely the most adequate legal techniques to deal with anti-
competitive behavior. Per se rules, prohibiting certain kinds of behavior deemed 
to be anti-competitive independently from the concrete effects this behavior is 
expected to provoke in a specific situation, have been confronted with the rule of 
reason under which the probable effects of a particular case are evaluated. The 
reduction of uncertainty is an important function of institutional arrangements. 
This holds also true for competition rules. Per se rules are supposedly better 
suited to reduce uncertainty than the rule of reason as with that arrangement, some 
competition officers, judges or other actors have to make decisions based on the 
specific merits of the case. This presupposes that the necessary competence to 
make such evaluations be readily available. It has been argued that any such 
presupposition would be a pretence of knowledge (Hayek 1978) and that 
competition policy should thus exclusively rely on per se rules. 
Williamson praises the merits of the rule of reason which he calls „flexible legal 
process“ (1996, 283): “Rather than assert false certitude, the legal process 
approach urges that complicated issues of economic organization that are poorly 
understood be accorded respect. The object is to move toward a progressively 
more informed disposition of the issues as the relevant theory is refined and 
implemented …” It is precisely the recognition of the fact that we only dispose of 
incomplete and uncertain knowledge that leads Williamson to plead in favor of 
the rule of reason. Rather than discussing the pros and cons of these two positions 
further, we propose to test whether the techniques adopted to deal with various 
                                                 
6   The coding of this variable is, of course, debatable: first, it can be argued that only some of the 
practices are in conflict with competition but not others (as, e.g., price discrimination or 
interlocking directorates). Second, it could be argued that the implied linear relationship between 
the number of practices dealt with and the effects on the degree of competition observed in a 
country was not linear but that some practices were more important than others, that there might 
be some minimum threshold, that the number was subject to decreasing (or increasing) marginal 
returns etc.  12
kinds of anti-competitive behavior have any significant effect on our variables of 
interest. The two techniques mentioned can be interpreted as the two ends of a 
continuous variable; an example for a legal technique between the two extremes 
are per se prohibitions with an enumeration of exceptions (as, e.g., found in the 
German Act on Competition Restraints that is based on a per se prohibition of 
cartels, but names an extended list of exceptions). 
Hence, the coding of this variable is quite difficult. On the other hand, the two 
conjectures are exactly opposite to each other, which means that the sign of the 
estimated coefficient will be of particular interest. Coding is based on the 
assumption that the more economic approach is right, hence per se prohibitions 
(but also per se permissions) were coded 0, whereas the rule of reason was coded 
1 and exceptions as the intermediate case 0.5. The value of the variable was 
normalized for the number of practices that competition laws deal with. Turkey 
follows the per se approach closest with six kinds of behavior regulated according 
to it. On the other side of the coin are Argentina, Brazil and Uzbekistan where 
seven kinds of behavior are dealt with drawing on the rule of reason. These are the 
absolute numbers. Since not all practices mentioned are dealt with in all countries, 
it might be more meaningful to have a look at the normalized scores: in the 
Philippines (0.0), Poland (0.08), Armenia (0.12) and Turkey (0.14), the economic 
approach has made the least headway. Five countries entirely rely on the rule of 
reason (and thus receive a 1.0): These are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland 
and Uzbekistan.7 
The second aspect recognized in the economic approach indicator counts the 
number of instruments that have been discussed (and promoted) by economists 
only in recent years, which are part of the currently valid competition law. The 
instruments asked for are (i) collective dominance, (ii) conglomerate effects, (iii) 
leniency programs, and (iv) the effects doctrine (variable 7 in the questionnaire). 
If one (or more) of these instruments is part of the current competition law, this 
can be interpreted as a sign for the willingness of the actors to keep up with recent 
developments. It can also be interpreted as following a “more economic 
approach” (as opposed to a “more legalistic approach”). The “effects doctrine” is 
somewhat apart from the other three instruments and it could be conjectured that 
reliance on it reflects factual economic strength rather than following an economic 
approach (the partial correlation coefficient between following the effects doctrine 
                                                 
7   Five other jurisdictions have found the perfect middle course, at least scorewise: Bulgaria, the EC, 
Germany, Lithuania and Taiwan all have a coding of 0.5.  13
and the absolute size of the GDP in 2000 is, however, only a rather modest .295). 
Use of any of the first three instruments was coded 0.33, i.e. countries relying on 
all three instruments scored 1. 12 countries had installed all three instruments, 
whereas 12 countries used none of them. With the exception of South Africa, all 
of these twelve countries’ competition laws were only passed in 1991 or later. 
The third variable follows a similar logic as the one just dealt with but is 
constrained to how mergers are handled. In the European Union, the criterion used 
to decide whether a merger is compatible with the Common Market was recently 
changed from the so-called “dominance criterion” hitherto used to the “substantial 
impediment to effective competition criterion” that has been used in the U.S. and 
in a number of other jurisdictions. “Dominance” and “substantial lessening of 
competition” were thus meant as alternatives. Yet, the representatives of 21 
competition agencies declared that in their country, both criteria were used (Brazil 
and Colombia are  the only countries that have a merger policy but do not rely on 
either of them). The use of remedies in merger policy indicates, again, a case-by-
case approach as opposed to a more rigid per se approach. The same holds true 
with regard to efficiencies where the competition agency has the competence to 
evaluate whether an otherwise problematic merger can be consummated because 
representatives of the agency expect important efficiencies to emerge as a 
consequence of the merger. 
Whether the “economic approach” – with its reliance on insights based on game 
theory and its emphasis on incentives – or the “legal approach” – with its possibly 
positive effects on the predictability of competition policy – is more conducive to 
growth is open to speculation. In order to reduce speculation, we have created the 
second indicator that reflects the degree to which a country follows an “economic 
approach”.8 
3.3 The Structure of Competition Agencies 
We now turn to the organizational structure of the competition agencies that are 
supposed to implement the competition laws. As spelled out above, particular 
emphasis is put on the independence of the agencies. Formal and factual 
independence do no necessarily coincide. This is why two separate indicators are 
                                                 
8   One could assume that introduction of a more economic approach could be a function of per 
capita income. The partial correlation between our ECONAPP variable and per capita gdp in 2000 
is, however, only a modest .299.  14
developed, one for the de jure and one for the de facto independence of 
competition agencies. 
For the purposes of this paper, an independent competition agency is one that 
investigates anticompetitive behavior as specified in the competition law without 
interference from members of the executive. Independence further implies that the 
decisions of the competition agency will be carried out even if they are not in the 
interest of the executive. It also implies that competition officers – apart from 
their decisions being implemented – do not have to anticipate negative 
consequences as the result of their decisions, such as (a) being expelled, (b) being 
paid less, or (c) being made less influential. 
3.3.1 Indicator #3: The de jure independence of competition agencies 
The first issue in ascertaining the independence of the competition agency is thus 
to inquire whether the agency finds itself under the direct supervision of the 
government or not (variable 9). 40 out of 57 agencies are not subject to the direct 
supervision of the executive. The second variable here considered deals with the 
issue whether the sole task of the agency is to safeguard competition (“1”) or 
whether it has to pursue other goals (“0”). 32 out of the 57 agencies are restricted 
to safeguarding and promoting competition (variable 10). The following variable 
(variable 11) is based on the assumption that the more competences are formally 
attributed to the competition agency, the better it should be able to fulfill its tasks. 
20 out of the 55 agencies for which we have information have all five 
competences named in that variable at their disposition. Given that the court 
system is sufficiently independent, the possibility to take a case decided by the 
competition agency to court supposedly increases the incentives of the 
competition agency to apply the competition law as closely as possible. This is 
why countries in which courts have the power to inquire into both the procedural 
as well as the substantive aspects of a competition agency decision received a 
score of 1, countries in which courts were restricted to the review of procedural 
analysis were scored .5 and countries in which the courts did not play any role 
were simply coded 0. Out of the 57 countries analyzed, there was none in which 
the courts do not play any role (7 countries were coded .5, 47 the full score). 
The appointment procedure of the leading members of the competition agency is 
another variable of interest. For lack of a generally accepted generic term for the 
head of competition agencies, we propose to call them competition officers in the 
introduction to this variable. It is hypothesized that appointment through one 
important member of the executive (e.g., the minister of economics) is less  15
conducive to independence than appointment procedures that provide for the 
participation of representatives of more than one government branch. More than 
two third of all competition laws (40 out of 57) preview appointment of the 
competition officer solely through the executive. 
It is further conjectured that the legal term length of the competition officer is 
another important variable for the independence of the agency. We assume that 
they are most independent if they are appointed for life (or up to a mandatory 
retirement age) and cannot be removed from office, save by legal procedure. 
Average tenure over all countries in which term limits apply is 4.79 years. There 
are seven countries in which tenure is at least 12 years, but also six with less than 
four (Brazil, Greece, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand and Zambia). Competition officers 
are further assumed to be less independent if terms are renewable because they 
have an incentive to please those who can reappoint them. In 47 out of 57 
competition laws, reappointment is, however, possible. The gist of variable 16 
appears straightforward: the more difficult it is for government to get rid off the 
competition officer, the more independent can the agency assumed to be. 7 
competition laws preview a judicial procedure, but in 37 countries, competition 
officers can be kicked out of office following a decision either of parliament or 
the executive. 
Further, if the members of one of the other government branches enjoy discretion 
in determining the salaries of the competition officers, this raises incentives to 
take the preferences of these members explicitly into account. In contrast, general 
rules that their salaries cannot be reduced increase, in turn, the independence of 
the competition agency. Eleven competition laws prevent income reductions, 
whereas 41 do not. 
If the allocation of cases to the various members of the competition agency is at 
the discretion of the competition officer, his influence on the outcomes of cases is 
potentially important because he could allocate cases to those who he expects to 
prepare decisions that are in line with his own prejudices. We expect 
independence to be larger if there is a general rule according to which cases are 
allocated within the competition agency (17 competition laws know a general 
allocation rule, 35 do not). 
The competition agency will be less independent if members of the executive 
have the formal power to give instructions. Quite generally, two kinds of 
instructions can be distinguished: those referring to specific cases and those 
issuing general guidelines. Specific instructions are assumed to mean less 
independence than general guidelines (which is why the specific instructions are  16
coded 0, whereas general guidelines are coded 1). In 8 countries, specific 
instructions are possible, in 13 countries, general guidelines can be issued and in 
23 countries, no instructions are legally possible at all. If the executive has the 
power to override decisions made by the competition agency, this will lead to a 
dependent, rather than an independent competition agency. In 9 countries, the 
competition office can be overridden by the executive, and in 44, it cannot. 
If the competition agency has to publish its decisions, and especially their 
economic rationale, these decisions can be scrutinized by others and the reasoning 
can become subject to public debate. This can be interpreted as making it more 
difficult for representatives of the other government branches to have irrelevant 
considerations influence their decisions. In 38 countries, the competition agency 
has to publish the economic rationale underlying its decisions, whereas in 18 
countries, it has not to. 
We have described a total of 13 different variables that cover different aspects of 
the formal independence of competition agencies. These are synthesized into our 
third new indicator that deals with the formal independence of competition 
agencies. The three top scorers here are South Africa (0.769) Spain and Colombia 
(both .692), the three bottom scorers China(.0238), Belgium (.331) and Malta 
(.333) The average score is .506.9 
3.3.2 Indicator #4: The de facto independence of competition agencies 
The variables presented in the last subsection all focused on the independence of 
competition agencies as provided for by law. But it is well-known that de jure 
independence is often not implemented, at least not entirely. In order to ascertain 
the factually realized levels of the independence of competition agencies, some 
other criteria are thus taken into consideration. A crucial aspect of the de facto 
independence is the effective average term length of the chief competition 
officer.10 If the actual term length and the one to be expected on the basis of the 
legal foundations deviate, the competition agency is assumed to be less 
independent than provided for in the books. Removing a competition officer 
before the end of term is a serious breach of independence. Whenever that has 
occurred at least once, the competition agency is assumed to be little independent. 
The countries with the lowest average tenure of competition officers are 
                                                 
9   Variables 22 and 23 were not integrated into any indicator. 
10   This variable is closely reminiscent of the turnover rate calculated for central bank governors and 
used as a proxy for their de facto independence.  17
Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Uzbekistan and Venezuela; average tenure in these 
countries is below two years. 
The importance of an adequate income was already discussed with regard to the 
de jure indicator. With regard to the de facto situation, we were interested to learn 
whether the incomes of competition officers have at least remained constant in 
real terms since 1990.11 36 competition agencies claimed that real income had 
remained at least constant whereas 12 said that this was not the case. But the 
efficacy of competition agencies does not only depend on the income level of 
competition officers but also on the number of staff employed, the size of the 
library, the availability of modern computer equipment etc. We have tried to take 
this aspect into account by asking for the development of the competition 
agency’s budget as an organization. 31 competition agencies declared that their 
budget had remained at least constant since 1990, whereas this was not the case in 
17 countries. 
If members of the executive give instructions to representatives of the competition 
agency, this is interpreted as a sign that they are not independent. The same holds 
if decisions by the competition agencies are overridden by the executive. We were 
interested in the number of times that this had happened between 1990 and 2000. 
This rather long period was chosen to reduce the possibility that any short-term 
events would be driving the result. The rather high mean values for both aspects 
(0.978 and 0.924 respectively) show that instructions seem to be the rare 
exception to the rule. 
In the first indicator, goals other than competition that were named in the 
currently valid competition laws had a negative impact on the actual score, the 
underlying assumption being that other goals made tradeoffs necessary and 
deflected attention from competition. With regard to the indicator described here 
(i.e. the one on factual independence), the potential role of courts in citing goals 
other than competition - although they are not explicitly spelled out in the 
competition law - is taken into consideration. If this happens, this can be 
interpreted as pressure on the competition agency produced by the judiciary which 
indicates a low level of de facto independence. The average score of .925 
indicates that this does not occur with great frequency. 
                                                 
11   Answering this question should have been difficult in many cases, since many competition agencies 
were created only after 1990, but the response rate to this question was not significantly lower than 
to the other questions.  18
Altogether, this indicator thus consists of nine variables. The average score is .756 
with a minimum of .23 and a maximum of 1.0. In line with expectations, the 
variation is larger than with regard to the third indicator. Data availability is a 
particular problem with regard to this indicator: many competition agencies were 
only created post 1990 and could thus not meaningfully respond to some of the 
questions. In order to secure a minimum level of comparability, only countries for 
which information on at least three of these variables were available are included 
in the analysis. 
3.4 Partial Correlations Among Indicators 
In order to get a feel for the results, it might be useful to have a look at the 
correlations the indicators display (i) amongst each other and (ii) with other 
indicators previously used to proxy for competition policies. A look at the 
correlation matrix reveals that the correlations between the four indicators are 
rather high although they are far from perfectly correlated. This could simply 
reflect the fact that the indicators are to proxy for different concepts. The 
correlation matrix also contains correlation coefficients with two subjective 
indicators of competition. One is from the Global Competitiveness Report, which 
is published annually by the World Economic Forum. It is produced on the basis 
of a survey with top business executives from 80 countries who are asked to rank 
their own country with regard to the statement “Antimonopoly policy in your 
country is 1 = lax and not effective at promoting competition, 7 = effective and 
promotes competition”. The other subjective indicator is taken out of the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook, which is produced on an annual basis by the 
Lausanne-based International Institute for Management Development (IMD). 
Here, business people were asked: “Do anti-trust laws prevent unfair competition 
in your country”? 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 






Basis 1           
EconApp 0,699    1       
De jure Ind.  0,730   0,818  1     
De facto 
independence 
0,710   0,873 0,915  1   
GCR  0,363 0,494 0,560 0,625    1 
WCY  0,010 0,130 0,230 0,266 0,818 
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Four observations appear noteworthy: First of all, it is noteworthy that the two 
variables are highly correlated (partial correlation = .818). Second, the correlation 
coefficient with our four indicators is substantially lower. This can mean that the 
“competition friendliness” of a competition agency cannot be convincingly 
grasped by focusing on the legal basis and the factual behavior as we have tried to 
do. But it could also be another proof for the precariousness of subjective 
indicators: if an economy displays a good overall performance then the country’s 
competition policy must be effective - or so the businesspeople surveyed might 
think. If this is the reasoning behind their answers, we are confronted with a huge 
endogeneity problem. Third, the correlation of the competition indicators here 
introduced with the indicator provided by the Global Competitiveness Report is in 
general clearly higher than that with the one provided by the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook. Fourth, among the four indicators introduced here, the 
partial correlation between the indicator representing the de facto independence of 
competition and the two subjective indicators is the highest. Businesspeople 
might, hence, form their opinions on the observed behavior of competition 
agencies, rather than on the law as written in the books. 
The first look at the data does not allow us to draw any firm conclusions yet, but 
the rather low partial correlations between the various indicators could be of some 
concern. Before using some econometrics in section five in order to analyze the 
effects of competition policies on economic variables, we turn to deal with the 
question whether competition policy narrowly conceived is a good predictor for 
competition policy more broadly delineated. 
4 Are Competition Policies a Good Predictor for Attitudes Toward 
Competition More Broadly Delineated? 
If competition policies in the narrow sense are to safeguard competition, they 
should be correlated with the absence of barriers to (international) trade, of 
barriers to open new firms, of bureaucratic impediments in the management of 
firms etc. It has been argued that the introduction of competition laws can be 
interpreted as a government promise to avoid more intrusive forms of government 
intervention into the markets (Green 1987). The credibility of such a promise will, 
however, be low if policies in other areas are not in line with it. Such policies 
cannot only be expected to be a direct hindrance to growth, but also to make 
government promises in other areas (such as competition) less credible and hence 
constitute an indirect hindrance to growth. In this section, we set out to ask 
whether the existence of competition laws and their implementation by  20
(independent) competition agencies is indeed in line with other pro-competitive 
government policies. 
A straightforward way in which government can enable competition is to refrain 
from making entry costly or even impossible. We distinguish between two aspects 
of state-mandated entry barriers here, namely foreign and domestic ones. If 
foreign firms can easily offer their products on the domestic market, a high level 
of competition should result. Openness and competition policy in the narrow 
sense should thus go hand in hand. A first indicator for openness towards 
international competition is the sum of exports plus imports as a share of GDP, 
capturing the volume of trade. A second indicator is to capture trade policies by 
the ratio between the actual size of the trade sector and the size expected 
according to economic theory. This is calculated on the basis of gravitation 
models and takes the size of a country’s population, its geographical position etc. 
into account. A third indicator has been introduced by Sachs and Warner (1995) 
which is a dummy variable calculated on the basis of five different criteria. Ex 
ante, it is unclear what the best indicator for the possibility of foreign competition 
is. It is noteworthy how small the partial correlation coefficients between the 
various indicators for openness are: that between the weighted trade and years 
open is only 0.09. 
Strong negative correlations between the competition and the openness indicators 
could mean that in the absence of competition laws, legislators use trade policy as 
a substitute for competition policy: Small states might not have the means to set 
up a competition authority of their own and might want to secure competitive 
pressure on domestic firms by opening up their home markets. Strong positive 
correlations would indicate that these two policies are used in a complimentary 
fashion. Unfortunately, the data do not offer any clear-cut information: the signs 
for the correlation coefficients with the openness as well as the weighted trade 
variable change but never reach any traditional level of significance. Relying on 
the years open indicator would, however, lead us to conclude that the two policies 
are used in a complimentary fashion. 










Openness -0,134 -0,124 -0,126 -0,097 0,056 0,128 
Weighted 
Trade
-0,061 -0,068 -0,015 0,014 0,064 -0,215 
Years Open 0,359 0,388 0,331 0,358 0,492 0,551 
Starting  -0,487 -0,491 -0,516 -0,526 -0,509 -0,368  21
Business
Hiring & Firing 0,055 -0,104 -0,074 -0,117 -0,426 -0,430 
Price Controls 0,251 0,073 0,247 0,160 0,453 0,662 
Industrial 
Policy
-0,266 -0,707 -0,485 -0,651 -0,414 -0,282 
Government 
Effectiveness
0,484 0,605 0,548 0,604 0,845 0,796 
Regulatory 
Quality
0,594 0,645 0,623 0,636 0,786 0,792 
 
We now turn to the possible connection between competition laws and domestic 
barriers to entry mandated by the state. De Soto (1990) pointed to the importance 
of regulatory procedures as an impediment for many entrepreneurs to become 
legal. Governments that have an interest in strong competition should thus aim at 
making domestic entry easy. Based on the ideas of de Soto, the World Bank 
publishes the “Doing Business” survey which contains (i) the number of 
procedures, (ii) the official time, and (iii) the official cost that a start-up has to 
incur before it can operate legally. In order to insure maximum comparability 
across countries we use the cost expressed as a percentage of income per capita 
here (World Bank 2004). Higher indicator values mean higher costs. If 
competition policies and domestic entry policies go hand in hand, we should thus 
indicate negative correlation coefficients. This is indeed the case. 
Barriers to exit can prevent a (potential) competitor from entering a market in the 
first place. They can thus constitute barriers to entry. Not all of these are 
determined by technology (the sunk cost argument), some are the effect of 
regulation. Strict rules on hiring and firing labor are a case in point. The Doing 
Business Survey also contains an employment laws indicator that is composed of 
(i) the flexibility of hiring, (ii) the conditions of employment and (iii) the 
flexibility of firing. If hiring and firing legislation was pro-competitive, then we 
would get negative correlations because the employment index takes values 
between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation. Our four 
indicators are basically uncorrelated with this indicator. It is, however, worth 
mentioning that the two subjective competition indicators do have the expected 
sign. Based on our indicators, no conclusion regarding the compatibility of the 
two policy areas is possible. Based on the two subjective indicators, it seems as if 
policies were largely in line with each other. 
Historically, governments have often sought to control a number of prices for 
various reasons. Yet, if prices cannot properly reflect changes in market 
conditions, they will partially lose informative value which will lead to losses in 
allocative efficiency. “Competition friendly” governments should thus largely  22
abstain from price controls. The variable “price controls” is taken from the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook (2001) and the exact wording is “Government price 
controls (do not) affect pricing of products in most industries.” Higher scores 
indicate less price controls, hence the correlations should be positive. Correlations 
are indeed positive, the subjective indicators again more significantly so than the 
objective ones introduced in this paper. 
Industrial policy is often at odds with a policy in favor of competition. Whereas 
competition policy trusts in the incentives of the market actors as well as the 
invisible hand of the market itself, industrial policy is often based on the 
assumption that due to some market failures, the government could increase 
welfare by heavily influencing the structure of the market. A sincere competition 
policy should thus be connected with a low level of industrial policy. In order to 
test such a presupposition, one would need a measure for industrial policy. To the 
best of our knowledge, such a measure has not been constructed. We therefore 
propose to test whether our competition policy variables are correlated with the 
amount of subsidies as a fraction of Gross Domestic Product. This variable is 
taken from the Economic Freedom Index and subsidies are not expressed in 
percent of GDP but in a score ranging from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). If countries 
scoring well in competition policy spend little on industrial policy, a positive 
correlation should hence result. This is, however, not the case. There are 
significant negative correlations indicating that high levels of competition policy 
are often combined with high levels of industrial policy. 
Finally, we are interested in the correlation between our competition indicators 
and the quality of institutions in general. Kaufman et al. (2003) contains two 
interesting indicators, one measuring “government effectiveness” which includes 
the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political 
pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The 
second indicator is called “regulatory quality” and includes measures of the 
incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank 
supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive 
regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. As expected, 
the correlation between these two variables and our four competition indicators 
are quite high albeit not as high as with the subjective competition indicators. 
All in all, the existence of competition policies is correlated with good institutions 
more generally; if a competition policy exists, domestic as well as foreign entry 
barriers tend to be lower than if there is no competition policy. However, the  23
existence of a competition policy is strongly correlated with the existence of 
industrial policy. Whether competition policies more narrowly conceived have 
any measurable effects on economic variables will be analyzed in the next section. 
5 On the Effects of Competition Policies on Economic Growth – Estimation 
Approach and Discussion of Results 
5.1 The Empirical Strategy 
The estimation approach is based on the assumption that differences in 
productivity can be attributed to differences in the quality of institutions. Good 
institutions are supposed to be productivity-enhancing. The hypothesis is that 
good competition institutions lead to higher (total factor) productivity. The model 
to be estimated is 
   TFPi = α + β COMPi + χ Zi + ε i      (1) 
Estimating the effects that competition policies have on total factor productivity is 
using a very coarse brush. Yet, other more fine-grained indicators such as mark 
ups on prices or intensity of competition have two huge disadvantages: they 
would have to be used over all sectors of an economy and the resulting averages 
would be almost meaningless. Secondly, these indicators are not available for a 
large number of countries. In recent years, the crucial role of institutions for total 
factor productivity has come to the fore (see, e.g., Hall and Jones 1999). 
Following Hall and Jones (1999), we calculate productivity as the residual of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function.12 Hall and Jones provide data for 1988, we 
recalculated them for the year 2000. Instead of the output per worker for 1988 the 
output per worker for the year 2000 was taken from the Penn World Tables 6.1 by 
Heston et al. (2002). The physical capital stock was calculated as an arithmetic 
mean of the capital stock calculated by Hall and Jones for 1988 and the aggregate 
investment in the period 1990-2000 again taken from Heston et al. (2002). An 
assumed depreciation rate of 6 percent for the capital stock means that the value 
of the 1988 capital stock has nearly lost half its value by the year 2000. Missing 
data for the 1988 capital stock in countries like Croatia, Ukraine, Slovakia were 
                                                 
12   Hall and Jones (1999) assume a production function Yi=Kiα(AiHi)1-α with Yi=Output per worker in 
country i (taken from the Penn World Tables), Ki=stock of physical capital in country i, 
Hi=amount of human capital-augmented labor used in production in country i and Ai=labor-
augmenting measure of productivity in country i. After rearranging the equation, Ai as the residual 
is calculated assuming α to be 1/3.  24
imputed by taking the data of the "mother countries" USSR, Yugoslavia and 
CSSR. The human capital variable is based on the average number of years that 
citizens above the age of 15 of the respective country spent in schools. It is 
assumed that school attendance is subject to decreasing marginal returns. 
Accordingly, the first years spent in school are supposed to lead to higher 
marginal returns than the last years spent there. Like Hall and Jones (1999), we 
assume a rate of return of 13.4 percent for the first four years of education, of 10.1 
percent for the next four years and of 6.8 percent for education beyond the eighth 
year. The data for the years of schooling were taken from 
www.worldbank.org/data. Missing data were imputed by augmenting the data in 
Hall and Jones for 1985 (originally provided by Barro and Lee 1993) with the 
average growth rate in schooling between 1985 and 2000. 
It might be argued that drawing on total factor productivity as the dependent 
variable would be premature as many competition laws have only been passed 
during the 1990s and it seems unlikely that they should have an important effect 
on the level of total factor productivity, rather than on its changes. On the other 
hand, total factor productivity for the year 2000 occurred more unequivocally 
after the establishment of competition laws than the growth rates currently 
available. Additionally, there is a serious endogeneity problem: it might be the 
case that competition laws are primarily enacted by countries with a high level of 
total factor productivity – and not vice versa.13 
Most cross-country growth equations take investment, schooling and initial GDP 
per capita explicitly into account before augmenting the model with the variable 
of interest. In estimating the influence of the various competition indicators on the 
productivity residual, we refrain from estimating a baseline model as the influence 
of the physical capital stock as well as human capital on the variation in output per 
worker is already captured by decomposing output per worker into its basic 
determinants. It is thus plausible to assume that differences in institutions are the 
primary and fundamental determinant of differences in productivity.14  In this 
                                                 
13   Additionally, there might be some selection bias as we did not receive questionnaires from all 
countries known to have competition policies. In order to check how serious it was, a table 
containing the descriptive statistics of the missing countries as well as the entire sample was 
constructed (it can be found in the appendix). Generally speaking, the analyzed sample does not 
suffer from a serious selection bias. 
14   This is in analogy to the Hall and Jones hypothesis according to which social infrastructure is the 
primary and fundamental determinant of total factor productivity.  25
approach it is, of course, crucial to control for the possible influence of other 
institutional arrangements via the Z-vector. 
We propose to include a number of standard economic variables (that result out of 
various policies which are, in turn, based on various institutions) as well as some 
political variables. A third group of variables controls for influences that are more 
truly exogenous such as the legal origin of a country and its fractionalization in 
terms of ethnicity and language. The more standard variables include (i) average 
government consumption in percent of GDP between 1990 and 2000, (ii) 
openness measured by the sum of exports and imports in percent of GDP, (iii) 
average population growth between 1980 and 1998, and (iv) the average inflation 
rate, all from the PWT 6.0 data set. In traditional growth theory, the so-called 
Solow Residual was attributed to “technical progress” which should hence also be 
controlled for. R&D expenditures have been found to have a positive effect on 
total factor productivity (Nickell 1996, 729) which is why we control for them. 
Since data on (v) the number of patents granted by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce is available for more countries, we decided to rely on the output of 
R&D, rather than on its input. 
We assume that institutional differences are the driving forces behind the variation 
in the Solow residuals. This is why we also control for a number of institutional 
variables such as (vi) the degree of political rights as provided by Freedom House 
which is often used as a proxy for democracy. We further control for (vii) the 
degree of civil liberties as provided by Freedom House. (viii) With regard to 
institutional quality, government effectiveness (taken from Kaufman et al. 2003) 
is included to find out whether the impact of competition policy still holds if a 
variable is included that focuses on institutional quality in a very broad sense and 
that may, hence, partly incorporate the quality of competition institutions as one 
of its components. 
Turning to the variables that are exogenous even in the long term, we control for 
(ix) the legal origin of countries as well as for their (x) ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization. As has also become standard practice, a (xi) latitude variable is 
used that controls for a number of geographic aspects. Additionally, we introduce 
a dummy in order to control for EU-membership.15 All EU members do not only 
have their own competition policies but are also subject to the competition policy 
                                                 
15   The EU itself will, however, not be counted as a country of its own in the estimates below. Malta, 
for whose competition policy we also have detailed information is not included because we lack 
detailed growth information as the country is not included in the Summers et al. (2001) dataset.  26
made in Brussels. In order to control for possible effects of this two leveled 
competition policy, a dummy is hence introduced. 
A potential problem with estimating the effects of competition policies on the 
average growth over the period from 1990 to 2000 is that the majority of 
competition laws were only passed after 1990. It almost suggests itself to 
constrain the estimations to those countries that have had a competition agency for 
at least 10 or 15 years, but this would considerably reduce the number of 
observations. A particular problem is that at least until the last decade, the 
introduction of competition laws seemed to be systematically correlated with per 
capita income. This means that the causation could run from income to 
competition laws – and not the other way round. This constitutes a serious 
endogeneity problem.16 This the reason for not relying exclusively on OLS but 
also on TSLS. For all four competition policy indicators, the same three 
instruments were used. They are (i) the distance of a country from the equator, (ii) 
whether a country has a common law legal origin, and (iii) the degree of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Inference is based on t-statistics computed on the 
basis of White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
5.2 The Estimation Results 
Tables 1a and 1b contain the regression results when standard economic variables 
are controlled for. All standard variables, except population growth, have the 
expected sign. Except population growth, all are significant at least at the ten 
percent level. This also holds for the EU-Dummy. In table 1b, population growth 
is dropped and inflation is introduced instead. It also has the expected sign and is 
highly significant. How do the newly introduced indicators do? Based on the 
OLS-estimates which are presented in the first four columns of both tables, a 
rather clear picture emerges: De facto independence seems to be most significant 
for explaining variation in total factor productivity whereas the economic 
approach misses conventional levels of significance.17 Both the formal basis of 
                                                 
16   If, in addition to this observation, the catch-up hypothesis is correct and poorer countries hence 
experience higher growth rates than richer ones, this constitutes a systematic bias against 
competition laws to have any positive effect on economic growth. In the extreme, countries with 
competition policies should experience less growth than countries without competition policies. 
17    The introduction of quadratic terms somewhat changes these results. They do not reach 
conventional levels of significance, except for the second indicator, i.e. the economic approach. 
Here, the quadratic term has a negative sign and it is significant around the one percent level (for  27
competition law and de jure independence always reach at least the ten percent 
significance level. How about economic significance? The coefficient of the de 
facto indicator is roughly 0.235, its standard deviation 0.399 (the descriptive 
statistics for the four new indicator are documented as part of appendix 2). As the 
total factor productivity of the U.S. has been standardized to one, that means that a 
one standard deviation improvement in the de facto independence of competition 
agencies lets a country catch up some 9.38 percentage points to the U.S.. As the 
standard deviation of the other indicators is lower (0.247 for the basis of 
competition legislation indicator, and 0.266 for the de jure independence of 
competition agencies), a one standard-deviation improvement would translate into 
a reduction of the total factor productivity-gap to the U.S. of some 6.18 (6.65) 
points. 
The estimates based on the instrumental variable technique are depicted in 
columns 5 through 8 of tables 1a and 1b. Instrumenting the competition variables 
does not make them insignificant. Hence, endogeneity is not an unsurmountable 
problem in this case. 
Table 2 asks whether the productivity-enhancing effect of competition laws and 
agencies survives if the four new indicators are tested in conjunction with other 
variables proxying for the quality of institutions. The first four columns show that 
Political Rights as delineated by Freedom House do not seem to contribute 
significantly to the Solow residual (indeed, the coefficients even have the “wrong” 
sign). Civil Liberties, in turn, have the expected sign and are significantly 
correlated with higher productivity in three out of four cases. The “rank order” of 
the four indicators that emerged when they were estimated in conjunction with 
economic variable seems to be confirmed here: the coefficients as well as the 
significance levels are fairly similar to the results displayed in table 1.18 The 
picture totally changes as soon as Government Effectiveness is taken into account. 
None of the other institutional variables survives its inclusion. On the one hand, 
this should definitely make us wonder about the robustness of the competition 
indicators. On the other, the variable “Government Effectiveness” is a very, very 
broad variable. Moreover, it is unclear what exactly has entered into its 
construction, so one should probably not over-evaluate these results either. 
                                                                                                                                      
column 2) and clearly better (for column 6). Hence, ￿too much￿ economic reasoning can be bad 
for you. 
18   Interestingly, the ￿quadratic effect￿ can also be observed with regard to the institutional variables: 
the square of the economic approach gets a negative coefficient which is significant on the two 
percent level (column 2) and the five percent level (column 6).  28
Table 3 presents the four new indicators in conjunction with some more truly 
exogenous variables such as latitude or a common law dummy. Again, the 
variable proxying for the economic approach is the least significant among the 
four new variables.19 The geographical variable “latitude” is highly significant in 
conjunction with all four new indicators, whereas “ethnic fractionalization” barely 
misses the ten percent significance level in all four equations. Columns 5 through 
8 deal more specifically with the question whether the legal origin is relevant for 
explaining the calculated variation of the residuals. The Scandinavian legal origin 
serves as a benchmark in this case. It turns out that only socialist legal origin 
countries do significantly worse than countries with a Scandinavian legal origin 
across all four equations. 
Although the four indicators are not robust to the inclusion of variables that cover 
the general quality of institutions, it might very well be the case that some of the 
single components that the indicators are made up of survive individually. It turns 
out that the number of years that a competition policy based on an explicit 
competition law has been in existence, the focus of the competition agency 
exclusively on competition, the impossibility to re-appoint the highest competition 
officer, and the development of the budget of the competition agency in real terms 
are the single most important variables. For policy makers, this is mixed news: the 
age of the competition law can obviously not be manipulated. On the other hand, 
the responsibility of the competition agency can very well be confined to 
competition and it is possible to increase the independence of competition 
agencies by excluding the possibility that the director of the competition agency 
can be re-appointed. 
6 Conclusion and Outlook 
We have introduced four new indicators to measure various aspects of 
competition law and competition policy. More precisely, the indicators cover (1) 
the formal basis of the competition legislation, (2) the degree to which it is based 
on an economic approach, (3) the formal independence of competition agencies, 
and (4) their factual independence. It was shown that competition policies when 
represented by these four indicators seem by and large compatible with other 
policy areas such as trade policy. Further, it was asked whether the four 
competition indicators help to explain differences in total factor productivity. It 
                                                 
19    As before, the quadratic term of the four indicators was only significant for the economic 
approach. Here, it enters with a negative sign and is significantly at the 1 percent level.  29
was shown that controlling for standard economic variables as well as institutional 
and more truly exogenous ones, the four indicators did seem to have an effect on 
total factor productivity. This vanishes, however, as soon as indicators are used 
that represent the quality of institutions very broadly conceived. 
This suggests the policy implication that the general quality of institutions is of 
primary interest and not necessarily the existence, age, content, and independence 
of competition laws and agencies. But this might be premature. First, it might very 
well be the case that introducing a competition law helps to improve the general 
quality of institutions in the long run. Secondly, it might simply be too early for 
any final verdicts on the effects of competition policy. After all, more than half of 
all existing competition agencies were created after 1990. 
A number of possible next steps for future research come to mind: first, it appears 
interesting to inquire more precisely into the transmission channels via which 
competition policies could have an impact on economic growth. It would, e.g., be 
interesting to see whether differences in market structures and price-cost margins 
can be explained by drawing on our competition indicators. A second logical next 
step is to endogenize the choice of competition policies. With regard to explaining 
the choice, a number of questions come to mind: is the first-time enactment of 
competition laws correlated with a certain minimum level of development, e.g. 
measured in income? If that is the case, competition laws will only be passed if 
the general institutional quality of a country is sufficiently good, otherwise, 
income levels would not have attained certain levels. This would, then, imply that 
competition laws are not a necessary condition for reaching fairly high income 
levels in the first place. Or is it closely correlated with very uneven firm-size? If 
there are no trusts that can be busted, politicians will not be able to cash in on the 
promise to trust-busting. Or are certain political regimes more likely to pass 
competition laws than others? Regimes in which politicians are also owners of the 
most important firms in a country might lack incentives to pass competition laws. 
A hundred years ago, only Canada and the U.S. had competition laws. Today, 
some 90 countries have such laws. It would be interesting to analyze whether 
there are certain patterns in the diffusion of competition laws: does yardstick 
competition take place also with regard to competition laws? Are the various 
approaches that are reflected in the various competition laws correlated with legal 
families or does the diffusion process rather work via geographical spreading of 
the laws? 
A distinction between de jure and de facto independence of competition agency 
was introduced. It is, of course, tempting to inquire whether there are variables  30
that could explain the deviation between the two. Elsewhere (Hayo and Voigt 
2005), it has been argued that the difference between de jure and de facto central 
bank independence can be explained with the different degree to which countries 
are able to make credible commitments. It has further been shown that this 
capacity is partially determined by the amount of factual judicial independence 
observed in a country. The degree of de facto Judicial Independence is interpreted 
as a proxy for the degree to which the rule of law is realized in a given country, 
i.e., for the degree to which government officials are constrained by rules. A 
similar reasoning could also be applied to competition agencies and the degree to 
which they have been able to maintain their independence from government. 
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On the Economic Effects of Competition Laws and Competition Authorities 
 QUESTIONNAIRE20 
Please return to: 
Prof. Dr. Stefan Voigt 
Economic Policy 




Country for which information is provided: 
_____________________________________ 
In order to avoid ambiguities, please tick either „yes“ or „no“ and do not leave blanks where 
both answers are offered as options. 
The substantive basis of competition policy 
(1)  Does the Constitution name competition 
as a goal to be achieved?            (1 ) YES   ( 0 ) NO 
(If yes, the relevant paragraph is __________________________________________). 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd, obs.: 0.245, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.432, 98. 
(2)  Is there a specific law that has the purpose of 
safeguarding and promoting competition?      ( 1 ) YES   ( 0 ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.649, 1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.479, 131. 
 
(3)  If yes: in what year was the first such law passed in your country?____1889___ 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs: 1981, 1991, 1890, 2003, 23.677, 88. 
 
                                                 
20   Please note that neither the coding scheme nor the descriptive statistics were contained in the 
version of the questionnaire sent to the competition authorities.  35
(4)  Are there other goals – beyond competition – that are 
mentioned in the currently valid competition laws?        NO  ( 1 ); 
YES, these are:   (a) consumer protection        (  ), 
      (b) technological progress       (  ), 
      (c) enhanced efficiency        (  ), 
      (d) international competitiveness      (  ), 
      (e) export success          (  ), 
      (f) small and medium enterprises      (  ), 
      (g) business cycle stabilization      (  ), 
      (h) employment concerns       (  ), 
      (i) regional development concerns      (  ), 
      (j) security of supply          (  ), 
(k) other __________________________________(  ). 
Coding: y= 1 - 0,125x; x=number of crosses from a through k; y ≥  0. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.344, 0.125, 0.0, 1.0, 0.385, 98. 
 
(5)  Do the currently valid competition laws provide measures against 
(a) cartels                (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(b) abuse of dominant position          (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(c) control of mergers            (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(d) predatory pricing           (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(e) price discrimination            (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(f) exclusive dealing           (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(g) interlocking directorates          (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(h) other _____________________________________________________(  ). 
Coding: y= 0,125x; x=number of crosses from a through  
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.458, 0.625, 0.0, 1.0, 0.406, 98. 
 
(6)  There are different techniques of dealing with various kinds of behavior that are deemed to be 
anti-competitive. Per se rules declare behavior to be compatible /incompatible with the law 
independently from the concrete effects to be expected in a particular situation. Under the rule of 
reason, in comparison, the probable effects of a particular case are evaluated. A third technique is 
to rely on per se rules, but to specify a number of exceptional circumstances, under which the 
general prohibition is not to be applied. Although this distinction is not razor-sharp, we would ask 
you to fill in one (or more) of the corresponding options. 
(PLEASE TICK THE MOST SUITABLE OPTION FOR EVERY KIND OF ACTION) 















Cartels          
Abuse of 
dominant position 
       
Mergers           36
Predatory Pricing           
Price 
discrimination 
       
Exclusive dealing           
Interlocking 
directorates 
       
Sums         
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd: 0.267, 0.143, 0.0, 1.0, 0.317, 97. 
 
(7)  Over the last couple of years, a number of concepts have gained some prominence in 
competition circles. Does the currently valid competition law provide for 
(a) collective dominance    (  ) YES   (  ) NO (if yes, since __________), 
(b)  conglomerate effects    (  ) YES   (  ) NO (if yes, since __________), 
(c)  leniency programs    (  ) YES   (  ) NO (if yes, since __________), 
(d)  the effects doctrine    (  ) YES   (  ) NO (if yes, since __________). 
Produce four columns; if answer is YES then simply code the year; ergo: if no year, the answer 
must have been NO 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.:  
 
(8)  With regard to mergers, various policy instruments can be used. Please indicate which of the 
following instruments are provided for under the currently valid competition law in your country 
(a) dominance      (  ) YES   (  ) NO (if yes, since __________), 
(b) substantial lessening of competition 
          (  ) YES   (  ) NO (if yes, since __________), 
(c) remedies      (  ) YES   (  ) NO (if yes, since __________), 
(d) efficiencies      (  ) YES   (  ) NO (if yes, since __________). 
Produce four columns; if answer is YES then simply code the year; ergo: if no year, the answer 
must have been NOImplementing Competition Legislation 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd: 
 
(9)  How are the currently valid competition laws to be implemented? 
(a) by an office under the direct supervision 
of the executive (e.g. the minister of finance or economy)      ( 0 ), 
(b) by an office not under the direct supervision 
of  the  executive          (  1  ), 
(c) other, namely _______________________________________________( ? ). 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.435, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.496, 93. 
 
(10)  If there is an office responsible for the implementation of the competition laws, are its tasks 
restricted to the safeguarding 
and promotion of competition             ( 1 ), 
or is it obliged to strive for the attainment of other goals     ( 0 ), 
(such as those mentioned in question 4)  37
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.348, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.479, 92. 
 
(11)  Does the Competition Office have competence with regard to 
(a) investigating anti-competitive behavior          (  ), 
(b) negotiating possible remedies            (  ), 
(c) deciding on the consequences of anti-competitive behavior    (  ), 
(d) intervene in the proceedings of sector-specific regulatory agencies 
  (such as those regulating utilities or natural monopolies)?      (  ), 
(e) anti-competitive behavior by state-owned enterprises?      (  ). 
Produce six columns (five for a-e plus one for the sum); if answer is YES then code “0,2” the sixth 
column contains the sum a-e. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd: 0.49, 0.6, 0.0, 1.0, 0.422, 91. 
 
(12)  Affected parties can challenge the decisions of the Competition Office 
(a) in court (please specify which court ___________________________)  (  ), 
  (aa) the court is restricted to procedural issues        ( 0,5 ), 
  (bb) the court has the power to inquire into 
         procedural as well as substantive issues         ( 1 ), 
(b) by turning to the executive (please specify who __________________)  ( 0 ). 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.545, 0.75, 0.0, 1.0, 0.477, 88. 
 
(13)  How is the head of the competition office (called “competition officer” here) 
nominated/appointed/elected? (PLEASE TICK ONLY THE MOST APPROPRIATE LETTER) 
(a)  Competition officers are nominated and appointed by one or 
more members of the executive;            (  ), 
(b)  Competition officers are nominated by one or more members of the Executive and are 
elected by parliament (or a committee thereof);  (  ), 
(c)  Competition officers are nominated by one or more members of the executive and are 
elected by the judiciary;        (  ), 
(d)  Competition officers are nominated and elected by parliament (or a committee thereof);
        (    ), 
(e)  Competition officers are nominated by parliament (or a committee thereof) and are 
appointed by one or more members of the executive;    (  ), 
(f)  Competition officers are nominated by parliament (or a committee thereof) and are elected 
by the judiciary;            (  ), 
(g)  Competition officers are nominated and elected by the judiciary;  (  ), 
(h)  Competition officers are nominated by the judiciary and are appointed by one or more 
members of the executive;          (  ), 
(i)  Competition officers are nominated by the judiciary and are elected by parliament (or a 
committee thereof);          (  ),  38
(j)  Competition officers are nominated by the judiciary, the legislature, or the executive and 
are elected by actors not representing any government branch (academics, the public at 
large).       (    ), 
(k)  Competition officers are elected by still another procedure, namely_____ 





  Competence to elect/appoint “competition 
officer” 
    Executive  Legislature  Judiciary  
Executive   0 (“a”)  1/3 (“b)  2/3 (“c”) 





Judiciary  2/3 (“h”)  2/3 (“i”)  1 (“g”) 
  Additional coding notes: nomination by PM AND appointment by PRES in non-pres. 
Systems = 1/6; 2 different chambers = 1/3; PM AND two different houses = ½; trade and 
professional associations = 0. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.086, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.203, 92. 
 
(14)  What is the legal term length of the Competition officer? 
NUMBER OF YEARS____________ 
 
Term of office(too)  coding 
≥  12 years    1,0 
10 ≤  too < 12    0,8 
8 ≤  too < 10    0,6 
6 ≤  too < 8    0,4 
4 ≤  too < 6    0,2 
4 > too      0,0 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd: 0.2, 0.2, 0.0, 1.0, 0.291, 89. 
 
 
(15)  Can Competition officers be reelected?      ( 0 ) YES   ( 1 ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.012, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.109, 84. 
 
(16)  How can Competition officers be removed from office? 
(a) only by judicial procedure;           ( 1 ) YES   (  ) NO,  39
(b) by decision of one or more members 
of the executive;               ( 0 ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(c) by decision of parliament (or a committee thereof);    ( 0 ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(d) by joint decision of one or more members of the executive and of parliament (or a committee 
thereof).           ( 1/2 ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(e) other, namely _______________________________  ( ? ) YES   (  ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.113, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.296, 85. 
 
(17)  Is there a measure preventing income reductions of Competition officers in real terms? 
            ( 1 ) YES   ( 0 ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.125, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.333, 88. 
 
(18)  Is there a general rule allocating the responsibility concerning incoming cases to specific 
members of the Competition office?    ( 1 ) YES   ( 0 ) NO, 
(or does the Competition Officer have discretion on the allocation of cases?)   
                 ( 0 ) YES   ( 1 ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.193, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.397, 88. 
 
(19)  Do members of the executive have the power to give instructions to the competition office 
(a) with regard to specific cases           ( 0 ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(b) by issuing general guidelines           ( 0,5 ) YES   (  ) NO, 
(c) not at all?                ( 1 ) YES   (  ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.369, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.441, 80. 
 
(20)  Do members of the executive have the power to override decisions made by the competition 
office?             ( 0 ) YES   ( 1 ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.494, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.503, 89. 
 
(21)  Does the competition office have to publish the economic rationale underlying its decisions? 
                ( 1 ) YES   ( 0 ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.413, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.495, 92. 
 
(22)  If there is an office responsible for the implementation of the competition laws, is there more 
than one such office (as the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice in the U.S.)  (  ) YES   (  ) NO. 
OFFEN 
 
(23)  Does the competition office have the competence to initiate proceedings by itself 
             (   1   ) ?  
Or does it depend on others to kick of proceedings        (  )? 
These are  (a) the executive          (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
    (b) the legislature           (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
    (c) the judiciary           (  ) YES   (  ) NO,  40
    (d) consumers             (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
    (e) competitors           (  ) YES   (  ) NO, 
    (f) others, namely _________________________   (  ) YES   (  ) NO. 
six columns, each yes gets a “0,16”; a seventh column contains the sum of a-e. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.455, 0.52, -0.96, 1.0, 0.512, 92. 
 
(24)  What has been the effective average term length of Competition officers since the respective 
legal foundations have been passed? IN NUMBER OF YEARS______ 
For coding, the number of years was multiplied by 0.05. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.144, 0.108, 0.0, 0.75, 0.168, 80. 
 
(a) does it deviate from the average term length 
to be expected by the legal foundations?       ( 0 ) YES   ( 1 ) NO, 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.413, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.496, 75. 
 
(b)  How many Competition officers have been removed from office before end of term? 
NUMBER_____ 
For coding, any positive number led to a zero-coding. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.468, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.502, 79. 
 
(25)  Has the income of Competition officers remained at least 
constant in real terms since 1990?           ( 1 ) YES   ( 0 ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.429, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.498, 84. 
 
(26)  Has the budget of the competition office remained 
at least constant in real terms since 1990?          ( 1 ) YES   ( 0 ) NO. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.369, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.485, 84. 
 
(27)  Between 1990 and 2000, how many times have members of the executive given instructions 
to the competition office 
(a) with regard to specific cases; number of times__________________ 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.496, 0.8, 0.0, 1.0, 0.495, 73. 
(b) by issuing general guidelines; number of times__________________. 
Please type in numbers as provided! 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0,468, 0.2, 0.0, 1.0, 0.488, 73. 
 
(28)  Between 1990 and 2000, how many times have members of the executive overridden 
decisions made by the competition office?__________________________times. 
Please type in number as provided: 
The answers were coded using the following table: 
Number of changes  Coding 





more     0,0 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd., obs.: 0.5, 0.8, 0.0, 1.0, 0.492, 74. 
 
(29)  Have interested parties successfully referred to any of the goals spelled out in question four 
above in order to challenge decisions of the competition office in court although they are not 
explicitly spelled out in competition law? NO  ( 1 ); 
YES, namely:   (a) consumer protection        (  ), 
      (b) technological progress       (  ), 
      (c) enhanced efficiency        (  ), 
      (d) international competitiveness      (  ), 
      (e) export success          (  ), 
      (f) small and medium enterprises      (  ), 
      (g) business cycle stabilization      (  ), 
      (h) employment concerns       (  ), 
      (i) regional development concerns      (  ), 
      (j) security of supply          (  ), 
(k) other __________________________________(  ). 
Name all letters; then do y= 1 - 0,125x; x=number of crosses from a through k. 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd: 
 
(30)  Assume a fairly complex merger case to be notified in your country. 
From notification until the final decision of the highest court, 
(a) how many months will pass on average       ____________ 
Please type in number as provided: 
 
(b) how many months will pass if everything that can possibly go wrong goes wrong   
        ____________. 
Please type in number as provided: 
Descr. Stats: mean, median, min, max, sd: 
 
General comments (please feel free to make any comment): 
  42
Appendix 2: 










Albania  0,318  0,791  0,410    
Angola 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Argentina  0,612  0,666  0,362 0,450 
Armenia  0,595  0,187  0,500 0,230 
Australia  0,620  0,388  0,592 0,872 
Austria  0,322  0,595  0,523    
Bangladesh 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Belgium  0,288  0,75  0,331 0,800 
Belize 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Benin 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Bolivia 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Brazil  0,664  0,5  0,581 0,903 
Bulgaria  0,559  0,583  0,400 0,694 
Canada  0,474  0,666  0,554 0,798 
Central African 
Republic 
0,000 0 0,000  0,000 
Chad 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
China  0,115  0,375  0,238    
Colombia   0,761  0,692 0,642 
Congo, rep.  0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
CostaRica  0,360  0,472  0,542 0,814 
Croatia  0,526  0,694  0,400 0,594 
Cuba 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Cyprus  0,086  0,731  0,350 0,819 
Czech Republic  0,371  0,916  0,477 0,922 
Denmark  0,404  0,902  0,508 0,944 
Dominican 
Republic 
0,333  Na    
Ecuador 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Egypt, arab 
rep. 
0,000 0 0,000  0,000 
ElSalvador  0,333  Na    
Estonia  0,365  0,233  0,650 0,500 
Fiji 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Finland  0,343  0,904  0,650 0,969 
France  0,313  0,739  0,564 0,663 
Gabon 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Germany  0,471  0,7  0,625 0,967 
Ghana 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Greece  0,287  0,583  0,55 0,421 
Guatemala  0,333  Na    
Guinea 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Guyana 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Haiti 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Honduras 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Hungary  0,499  0,972  0,630 0,802 
Indonesia  0,181  0,785  0,548 0,708 
Iran, islamic 
rep. 
0,000 0 0,000  0,000 
Ireland  0,371  0,638  0,585 0,893 
Israel  0,173  0,85  0,500 0,953 
Italy  0,708  0,611  0,644 0,911 
Jamaica  0,240  0,142  0,607 0,772 
Japan  0,375  0,821  0,517 0,917 
Kazakhstan  0,080  0  0,417 0,775 
Latvia  0,243  0,785  0,577 0,636 
Lithuania  0,702  0,75  0,625 0,781 
Madagascar 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Malaysia 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Mali 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Mauritania 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Mexico  0,324  0,476  0,442 0,722 
Moldova  0,333  Na    
Morocco  0,012  0,809  0,558 0,396 
Mozambique 0,000  0  0,000 0,000 
Nepal 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Netherlands  0,474  0,722  0,417 1,000 
New Zealand  0,454  0,319  0,485 0,550 
Nicaragua 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Niger 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Nigeria 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Paraguay  0,333  Na    
Peru  0,621  0,642  0,446 0,572 
Phillipines  0,550  Na  0    
Poland  0,249  0,816  0,425 0,781 
Portugal  0,561  0,716  0,438    
Rwanda 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Senegal  0,154  0,062  0,636    
Singapore 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Slovakia  0,663  0,84  0,525 0,678 
South Africa  0,073  Na  0,769 0,813 
Spain  0,453  0,773  0,692 0,933 
Switzerland  0,664  0,833  0,446 0,939 
Syrian arab 
republic 
0,000 0 0,000  0,000 
Taiwan  0,288  0,25  0,511 0,683 
Tajikistan 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Tanzania  0,238  0,476  0,624 0,867 
Thailand  0,323  0,214  0,417    
Togo 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Tunisia  0,038  0,535  0,483 0,806 
Turkey  0,696  0,357  0,618 0,922 
Uganda 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
United 
Kingdom 
0,750  0,833  0,577 0,875 
Uzbekistan  0,327  0,333  0,466 0,820 
Venezuela, rp  0,577  0,484  0,500 0,638 
Vietnam 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Yemen 0,000  0  0,000  0,000 
Zambia  0,154  0,722  0,460 0,822 
Zimbabwe  0,023  0,595  0,457 0,714 Descriptive Statistics for the Four New Indicators 
  Formal Basis  Econ Approach  De jure Indpdce  De facto Indpdce 
Mean  0.245 0.606 0.310 0.436 
Median  0.239 0.667 0.417 0.550 
Min  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Max  0.750 0.972 0.769 1.000 
Std Dev.  0.247 0.231 0.266 0.399 
 
Comparison of Descriptive Statistics Missing Sample (Entire Sample) 
 Min  Max  Mean  Median  Std.-Dev. 







































































List of Variables 
Variable Description  Source 
Solow Residual  Calculation based on Hall and Jones (1999) as 
described in text; more recent data from Heston 
et al. (2002) 
Hall and Jones 




Aggregate Government Expenditures of all 
Government tiers; Average for the period 90 -00 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Openness  (Exports + Imports)/ GDP  Heston et al. (2002) 
Pop growth  Average population growth between 1980 and 
1998 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Inflation  Average Inflation rate from  Heston et al. (2002) 
Patents  Number of patents for invention granted by U.S. 
Department of Commerce distributed by 
country of origin; Sum of years 1993-1997 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce (2005) 
Political Rights  Measured on a scale from 1 to 7; 1 representing 
the highest degree of political rights; 1999. 
Freedom House 
(1999/2000) 
Civil Liberties  Measured on a scale from 1 to 7; 1 representing 





Based on a number of survey indicators, this 
variable is based on responses on the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of the 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, 
the independence of the civil service from 
political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies. 
Kaufman et al. (2003)
Common Law  Dummy for Common law legal origin; Coded 1 
for if legal origin is common Law, coded 0 if 
legal origin is any other 
La Porta et. al. (1999)
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization 1960 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 1960. 
Measures probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not 
belong to the same ethnolinguistic group 
Atlas Narodov Mira 
(1960) 
Ethnic Fraction.  Index of ethnical fractionalization  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Linguistic Fraction.  Index of linguistic fractionalization  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Religious Fraction.  Index of religious fractionalization  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Latitude  The absolute value of the Hall and Jones 
numbers; divided by 90. 
Hall and Jones (1999)
Dummy EU  Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if 
country is member of the EU, 0 if otherwise 
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Table 1a: 
OLS-Regressions of Solow Residuals (2000) on Competition Indicators and Economic 
Controls 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




   0.492* 
(2.106) 
   
Economic 
Approach 
  0.128 
(1.217) 





  0.223(*) 
(1.680) 





   0.234* 
(2.384) 
   0.342* 
(2.532) 


























































































Constant  0.526 0.559 0.508 0.470 0.346 0.161 0.257 0.307 
Technique  OLS OLS OLS OLS TSLS  TSLS  TSLS  TSLS 
2 R   0.433  0.439 0.433 0.433 0.631 0.638  0.637  0.638 
SER  0.241 0.243 0.244 0.240 0.211 0.209 0.209 0.209 
F-Stat  11.427**  10.788**  10.785**  9.913** 20.07** 20.67** 20.63** 20.68** 
J.-B.  3.215 2.154 3.532 2.255 2.585 2.068 2.261 2.047 
N  83 76 78 71 68 68 68 68 
The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-stats, based 
on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’ or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from 
zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and J. – B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals. 
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Table 1b: 
OLS-Regressions of Solow Residuals (2000) on Competition Indicators and Economic 
Controls 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




   0.359 
(1.220) 
   
Economic 
Approach 
  0.158 
(1.573) 





  0.276* 
(2.273) 





   0.235** 
(2.785) 
   0.240(*) 
(1.687) 
























































































Constant  0.512 0.487 0.439 0.437 0.446 0.316 0.391 0.431 
Technique  OLS OLS OLS OLS TSLS  TSLS  TSLS  TSLS 
2 R   0.479  0.496  0.499  0.495  0.586  0.594  0.591  0.591 
SER  0.230 0.231 0.229 0.226 0.223 0.221 0.222 0.222 
F-Stat  13.577** 13.290** 13.778** 12.439** 16.830** 17.36**  17.121** 17.165* 
J.-B.  3.009 2.087 3.211 2.380 2.312 2.164 2.183 2.125 
N  83 76 78 71 68 68 68 68 
The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-stats, based 
on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’ or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from 
zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and J. – B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals. 
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Table 2a: 
OLS-Regressions of Solow Residuals (2000) on Competition Law Indicators and 
Institutional Controls 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




   0.180 
(0.696) 










  0.203* 
(1.792) 





   0.228** 
(2.645) 
   0.095 
(0.570) 
















































Constant  0.585 0.593 0.581 0.510 0.653 0.621 0.629 0.654 
Technique  OLS OLS OLS OLS TSLS  TSLS  TSLS  TSLS 
2 R   0.340 0.344 0.346 0.322 0.479 0.477 0.479 0.478 
SER  0.260 0.263 0.261 0.265 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 
F-Stat.  13.260** 12.512** 12.926** 10.866** 17.771** 17.672** 17.75**  17.703** 
J.-B.  2.75  2.997 2.372 3.086 16.214**  15.157**  16.208**  15.641** 
N  96 89 91 84 74 74 74 74 
The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-stats, based 
on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’ or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from 
zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and J. – B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals. 
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Table 2b: 
OLS-Regressions of Solow Residuals (2000) on Competition Law Indicators and 
Institutional Controls 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




   0.143 
(0.592) 










  0.037 
(0.403) 





   0.076 
(1.115) 
   -0.023 
(0.155) 


















































Constant  0.426 0.414 0.403 0.356 0.444 0.661 0.495 0.520 
Technique  OLS OLS OLS OLS TSLS  TSLS  TSLS  TSLS 
2 R   0.550 0.587 0.587 0.588 0.584 0.586 0.583 0.583 
SER  0.214 0.209 0.208 0.205 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 
F-Stat.  30.054** 32.330** 32.966** 30.585** 26.669** 26.842** 26.479** 26.488** 
J.-B.  4.425 4.395 4.250 5.557(*)  18.021**  13.449**  15.603**  14.936** 
N  96 89 91 84 74 74 74 74 
The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-stats, based 
on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’ or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from 
zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and J. – B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals. 
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Table 3: 
OLS-Regressions of Solow Residuals (2000) on Competition Indicators and Legal Origin 
Controls 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




   0.533** 
(4.509) 
   
Economic 
Approach 
  0.070 
(0.698) 





  0.208(*) 
(1.798) 





   0.130 
(1.370) 
   0.393** 
(4.240) 



















    








    
Government 
Consumption 

































































Constant  0.267 0.274 0.247 0.262 0.681 0.479 0.577 0.492 
2 R   0.504  0.489 0.509 0.477 0.347 0.363  0.332  0.376 
SER  0.233 0.242 0.236 0.240 0.260 0.261 0.266 0.254 
J.-B.  0.940 0.932 1.432 1.662 3.317 1.209 1.366 0.904 
N  79 73 75 69 94 87 89 82 
The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-stats, based 
on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’ or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from 
zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and J. – B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals.  50
Table 5: 
OLS-Regressions of Solow Residuals (2000) on Competition Indicators and Very Broad 
Institutional Controls 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






      
Economic Basis 
of Comp. Law 
(ECONAPP) 




    
De jure Indepen-
dence 



































































Constant  0.481 1.259 0.466 1.179 0.449 1.202 0.456 1.104 
2 R   0.584  .473  0.619 0.492 0.619 0.479 0.623 0.485 
SER  0.207 0.233 0.201 0.232 0.200 0.234 0.196 0.229 
J.-B.  5.406(*) 3.312  5.681(*) 2.432  5.243(*) 2.737  5.480(*) 1.588 
N  95 94 88 87 90 89 83 82 
The table contains ß regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-stats, based 
on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’ or (*) indicates that the parameter is significantly different from 
zero on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level; SER is the standard error of the regression and J. – B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on 
normality of the residuals. 
 